Government Regulation

New U.S. Controls on Data Transactions with China, Russia, North Korea, Iran, Venezuela, and Cuba

On January 8, 2025, the DOJ finalized regulations that will prohibit or restrict all U.S. persons from engaging in data transactions with adversary countries, their companies and personnel. Under the headline of controlling “sensitive personal data” in “bulk” and government data, the details reveal that certain data sets trigger the controls in a very wide variety of scenarios not always intuitively sensitive or in mass quantities, presenting traps for the unwary. In addition, due to the DOJ’s adoption of OFAC’s exponential “50 Percent Rule”, enforcement and compliance will require extensive corporate ownership mapping.

Kenna Camper
By
Larry Sussman
T

he DOJ’s Access to U.S. Sensitive Personal Data and Government-related Data by Countries of Concern or Covered Persons (the “DOJ Data Control Rule”) was born out of Executive Order 14117. That order called for comprehensive controls on any acquisition, holding, use, transfer, transportation, or exportation of, or dealing in, any property in which a foreign country or national thereof has any interest where such involves U.S. sensitive personal data or government-related data presenting an unacceptable risk to national security. According to the policy buildup, access to U.S. data allows its adversaries to engage in malign foreign influence activities such as:

  • tracking and building profiles on U.S. individuals such as mobile device information, geolocation information, vehicle telemetry information, financial transaction data, biometric and genomic data, health care data, and data on individuals’ political affiliations and leanings, hobbies, and interests for illicit purposes.
  • collecting information on activists, academics, journalists, dissidents, political figures, or members of nongovernmental organizations or marginalized communities to intimidate them; curb political opposition; limit freedoms of expression, peaceful assembly, or association; or enable other forms of suppression of civil liberties.

In particular, the partially de-classified ODNI assessment on Cyber Operations Enabling Expansive Digital Authoritarianism stated:

Beijing’s commercial access to personal data of other countries’ citizens, along with AI-driven analytics, will enable it to automate the identification of individuals and groups beyond China’s borders to target with propaganda or censorship. Such access to analytics also will enable Beijing to tailor its use of a range of online and offline carrots and sticks to its targets outside of China – potentially on a large scale. 1

The DOJ also cited the Duke University study on Data Brokers and the Sale of Data on U.S. Military Personnel which explained:

Foreign and malign actors could use location datasets to stalk or track high-profile military or political targets,” [revealing] “sensitive locations—such as visits to a place of worship, a gambling venue, a health clinic, or a gay bar—which again could be used for profiling, coercion, blackmail, or other purposes 2

Countries of Concern, Adversary Countries, and PADFAA

The DOJ has determined that the following countries are the current “countries of concern” or “CoCs” subject to DOJ Data Control Rule because they have engaged in a long-term pattern or serious instances of conduct significantly adverse to U.S. national security, and because they pose a significant risk of exploiting U.S. data:

  • China (including Hong Kong and Macau);
  • Russia;
  • North Korea;
  • Iran;
  • Venezuela; and
  • Cuba

The CoCs overlap with the list of “adversary countries” identified for the Protecting Americans’ Data from Foreign Adversaries Act of 2024 (“PADFAA”), except for Venezuela and Cuba. According to the DOJ, PADFAA does not create a comprehensive regulatory system to adequately address national security risks. Notably, PADFAA is limited to actual data brokers while the DOJ Data Control Rule applies to all U.S. persons. We will discuss PADFAA, and its future, considering the subsuming features of the DOJ Data Control Rule, in a separate blog.

A Comprehensive Set of Data Transaction Contexts

What is remarkable about the DOJ Data Control Rule is the wide-ranging contexts of prohibited and restricted data transactions. The table below illustrates the real-life examples supported by the DOJ Data Control Rule which will be considered either prohibited or restricted.

What is Sensitive Data and Government Data?

The following tables identify the nature of the data subject to the DOJ Data Control Rule.  U.S. sensitive personal data (“Sensitive Data”) are defined using thresholds for the number or records or devices while government-related data (“Government Data”) is not subject to any threshold. 

Geofenced Areas Published by the DOJ

Covered Persons and Corporate Ownership Mapping

The recipient of Sensitive Data or Government Data must involve a CoC recipient or a "Covered Person" recipient.  Covered Persons include the following:

  • foreign entities organized in or having their principal place of business in a CoC;
  • foreign entities that are 50 percent or more owned (directly or indirectly, individually or in the aggregate) by a CoC or Covered Person;
  • foreign employees or contractors of CoCs or entities that are Covered Persons;
  • foreign individuals primarily resident in CoCs; and
  • persons published on the Covered Persons list.

The inclusion of Covered Person within the definition of possible shareholders follows OFAC's 50 Percent Rule.  In a simple case, a Covered Person causes its first-tier 50 percent subsidiary to be a new Covered Person.  The new Covered Person has the ability to cause additional new Covered Persons down each tier of ownership, infinitely.  For example, three tiers of ownership with 50 percent or more at each level would cause the second and third tier to be a new Covered Person despite the fact that the first Covered Person only has an indirect interest of 12.5% and 25%, of the third tier and second tier entities, respectively. 

More complex cases exist when the aggregate component of the 50 Percent Rule is applicable. In the example below, P and Q are Covered Persons. Due to aggregation, R is a new Covered Person. If S is also a Covered Person, T becomes a new Covered Person. T in turn has the ability to cause all of its progeny to become Covered Persons.

Follow this link to our video which illustrates the application of OFAC’s 50 Percent Rule.

Example application of OFAC 50 Percent Rule on Wirescreen

WireScreen also tracks historical and real time changes in ownership as well as various ownership structures unique to Chinese nominee and contractual control structures such as Variable Interest Entities. As noted by the DOJ:

Ownership percentages can fluctuate such that an entity could become a covered person, and such entities may be designated by the [DOJ] based on the significant controlling interest.

U.S. persons should exercise caution when … one or more covered persons may control by means other than a majority ownership interest. Additionally, persons should be cautious in dealing with such an entity to ensure that they are not engaging in evasion or avoidance of the regulations.

Anti-Circumvention, U.S. Person Direction Pitfalls, and Reporting Attempts 

The DOJ Data Control Rule contains a general anti-circumvention provision against evasion, avoidance, and conspiracies.  Without detail in the provision itself, the scope of this is described by way of a set of examples.  The examples cover evasion attempts by CoC nationals who enter the U.S. to make the transaction look like a domestic unregulated transaction and the use of shell companies and front companies.  In addition, there is a unique example involving AI training sets.  In the example, a U.S. subsidiary of a company headquartered in a CoC licenses a derivative AI algorithm that was trained on impulsivity identifiers for targeted advertising from a U.S. online gambling company.  Since the algorithm can reveal the raw training data, the transaction is prohibited when the subsidiary attempts to share the algorithm with its parent company.

Separately, the DOJ Data Control Rule provides that U.S. persons may also not direct any data transactions that would be a prohibited or restricted transaction if engaged in by a U.S. person.  For example, a U.S. officer, senior manager, or equivalent senior-level employee directs a foreign company to engage in a covered data transaction when the covered data transaction would be prohibited/restricted if performed by a U.S. person.  This would be considered a violation.  Same goes with U.S. persons that own a foreign company which in turn engage in such transactions that would be prohibited/restricted if performed by a U.S. person.  The DOJ Data Control Rule also contains a permissive example of these types of situations.  In the example, a U.S. person is employed at a U.S.-headquartered multinational company that has a foreign affiliate that is not a covered person.  The U.S. person instructs the U.S. company’s compliance unit to change its operating policies allowing the foreign affiliate to engage in transactions that would be prohibited/restricted if performed by a U.S. person.  This would rise to the level of a violation as well.

Finally, a report must be filed by any U.S. person that has received and affirmatively rejected an offer from another person to engage in a prohibited transaction involving data brokerage. Notably, the DOJ specifies that such rejected offers includes those situations where they are:

...automatically rejected using software, technology, or automated tools

Penalties

Violations of the DOJ Data Control Rule include civil penalties up to $368,136 or twice the amount of the transaction involved (whichever amount is greater).  Criminal penalties are available up to $1 million and 20 years of prison for willful violations.

CISA Security Requirements for Restricted Transactions

Restricted transactions are prohibited except to the extent they comply with predefined security requirements to mitigate the risk of access by CoCs and Covered Persons.

The requirements are separately produced and maintained by the Department of Homeland Security’s Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Agency (“CISA”). They include items such as basic organizational cybersecurity policies, physical and logical access controls, data masking and minimization, encryption, and the use of privacy-enhancing techniques.3

Exempted Transactions

The DOJ Data Control Rule contains a number of exemptions for data transactions for certain necessary transactions and certain transactions which present unique competing interests. 

Official government activities and otherwise authorized or treaty covered transactions are exempt as well as personal communications, certain information or expressive materials, certain travel and baggage data, routine inter-company administrative matters, and ordinary telecom services.  There is also provision for investment agreements which overlap with CFIUS authority subject to CFIUS mitigation compliance. Each of these are subject to various qualifications.

More detailed qualifications are provided for exemptions regarding financial services and certain life sciences activities. For example, certain financial services activities are exempt provided they are “ordinarily incidental” to basic financial services transactions (including e-commerce); however there are numerous pitfalls where ordinarily incident activities intersect with the vendor and employment scenarios involving CoC access presenting national security concerns. Similarly, drug and medical device approval related transactions that are reasonably required by law in adversary countries are also subject to detailed exemptions. These generally follow FDA standards such as for data that is de-identified or pseudonymized; however there are numerous carve-outs for transactions deemed to be unreasonable from a national security perspective.

1https://perma.cc/ZKJ4-TBU6

2https://perma.cc/BBJ9-44UH

3See https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/2025-01/Security_Requirements_for_Restricted_Transaction-EO_14117_Implementation508.pdf

Larry is an experienced lawyer who worked for over 20 years as a partner and Head of China at O’Melveny & Myers in Beijing, and as a partner at Hogan Lovells. As Special Counsel at WireScreen, he specializes in analyzing Chinese ownership structures and their associated national security and sanctions implications.

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