2025 revenue reached $127.5 billion (¥880.9 billion) — its second-highest total ever, about 1% below Huawei's 2020 record. Revenue fell sharply in the two years after Washington's restrictions bit hardest; Huawei has now recovered roughly 96% of that loss, and grew faster still in the first half of 2026.
Huawei is privately held and doesn't file the way a listed company does. Its annual report nevertheless provides audited group-wide results, while its borrowing in China's domestic bond market produces prospectuses and interim filings containing disclosures most private companies never publish. Huawei has raised approximately $3.1 billion (¥22 billion) through six bond offerings in 2026 alone.
The recovery was not a straight line. Washington repeatedly tightened its restrictions, and Huawei responded by selling the Honor phone brand, rebuilding its smartphone supply chain, developing Ascend computing systems and investing in new businesses. The company has been restructured; it is not the company Washington confronted in 2019. It now spans AI computing, automotive systems and energy technology; it remains heavily dependent on China while trying to control more of the technology beneath its products — and it gets there just as the oldest unresolved part of Washington's campaign reaches a courtroom.
Huawei was profitable in 2025, earning $9.8 billion, up 8.7%. But the recovery became more expensive in early 2026: first-half revenue rose 9.6%, to approximately $69.6 billion, while net profit fell 36%, to $3.54 billion, as research spending and production costs increased.† Huawei spent ¥192.3 billion (about $27.5 billion) on R&D in 2025 — 21.8% of revenue.
Washington's campaign against Huawei was never only economic. In January 2019, U.S. prosecutors brought two criminal cases: one accusing Huawei's device business of stealing trade secrets from T-Mobile, the other alleging bank fraud, wire fraud and sanctions violations tied to Iran. Prosecutors later expanded the second case to 16 counts.
That second case has outlasted Huawei's revenue collapse and recovery. An amended indictment in April 2026 dropped charges against two defendants and two bank-fraud counts; the T-Mobile case was separated out for a trial in October 2027. Jury selection in the remaining case began September 8, 2026. Huawei has denied wrongdoing throughout.
Meng Wanzhou, whose 2018 arrest in Canada over related allegations became the case's defining moment, is now a vice chairman of Huawei Investment & Holding, the company's parent. In June 2026, the judge ruled that prosecutors can use against Huawei a statement of facts Meng signed under her 2021 deferred-prosecution agreement, in which she acknowledged making false statements to a financial institution about Huawei's Iran business — over Huawei's objection. The revenue recovery this report opened with, and the criminal case that helped define Huawei's confrontation with Washington, converge in the same week.
Huawei's bond prospectus breaks its revenue into six lines. Two of them — networking equipment and consumer devices — still make up more than 80% of the total. But the mix has shifted every year since 2023, and one business in particular has grown almost tenfold.
ICT Infrastructure — networking equipment and services sold to telecom carriers and large enterprises; Huawei's original, still-largest business.
Terminal — consumer hardware: phones, tablets, laptops and wearables, increasingly tied together by HarmonyOS.
Digital Power — solar inverters, battery storage, EV charging and data-center power systems sold to industrial and utility customers.
Intelligent Automotive Solutions — self-driving and smart-cockpit components sold to automakers, largely through Yinwang.
Cloud Computing — public cloud infrastructure and AI services for enterprise customers, competing with Alibaba Cloud and Tencent Cloud.
Other businesses — rental income and revenue not allocated to any of the five operating segments.
Huawei has five operating segments, plus a residual "other" revenue line. None of the five changed nearly as quickly as Intelligent Automotive Solutions, its self-driving and smart-cockpit business, which rose from $0.65 billion (¥4.6 billion) in 2023 to $6.3 billion (¥45.0 billion) in 2025, up 72% in the last year alone. It's still much smaller than Huawei's device and telecom-infrastructure businesses, but it's now the company's fastest-growing major operation.
Huawei attributed $4.5 billion in external revenue directly to its cloud segment in 2025, less than automotive's $6.3 billion. But Huawei separately reported approximately $10 billion of total cloud-related revenue, including business recorded through other segments. Automotive has overtaken Huawei's narrowly reported cloud segment — not the larger cloud business as a whole.
Put together, the numbers describe a company that grew back into roughly its old size while building a new one inside it — one with a real foothold in cars and a cloud business whose size depends on how you draw the lines around it.
China still accounted for about 70% of Huawei's 2025 revenue. But growth was not evenly spread: overall revenue grew 2.2% in 2025, while China itself grew just 0.2% — Europe, the Middle East and Africa grew 8.8%, and Asia-Pacific grew 15.7%.
That complicates the simplest version of the comeback story — that Huawei recovered mainly by leaning on a protected home market. China's own growth rate barely moved. That means protection of Huawei's enormous domestic market cannot, by itself, explain its latest growth.
Huawei's recovery was built through specialized companies responsible for chips, cloud computing, software, energy and devices. Its fastest-growing operation now has a different structure: two important automotive partners have become shareholders alongside it.
Huawei Investment & Holding is the parent most people mean when they say "Huawei." Huawei says Ren Zhengfei owns less than 1% of it; the remainder is held through an employee shareholding arrangement represented by the company's trade union committee. The parent owns Huawei Technologies Co., the real operating hub, which in turn owns the chip-design units, the cloud business, the software arm, the energy-technology unit, the device business, and dozens of smaller entities besides.
The fastest-growing part of Huawei is no longer wholly owned. In January 2024, Huawei transferred its intelligent-driving and automotive-component business into a new subsidiary, Shenzhen Yinwang Intelligent Technology Co. Over the following year, two of Huawei's automaker partners bought in: Avatr Technology and Seres each agreed to pay $1.6 billion (¥11.5 billion) for a 10% stake, with payments completed in installments through 2025. That leaves Huawei holding 80% — still in control, but no longer the sole owner — at an implied valuation of roughly $16 billion (¥115 billion).
| Owner | Stake | Relationship |
|---|---|---|
| Huawei Technologies | 80% | Technology provider, controlling owner |
| Seres | 10% | AITO manufacturing partner |
| Avatr Technology | 10% | Changan-linked EV partner |
Huawei is not merely selling technology to automakers here. It has turned two important customers into shareholders of the company that supplies them — aligning them more closely with Huawei's automotive platform than an ordinary supplier relationship would.
The Yinwang transaction shows why entity-level records matter: business lines, assets and ownership can move between companies, while restrictions and commercial relationships attach to particular legal entities — not to "Huawei" as an abstract name.
That distinction may soon become even more consequential. In September 2025, the Commerce Department adopted a rule extending Entity List restrictions automatically to companies at least 50% owned by listed entities. The rule took effect immediately but was later suspended until November 10, 2026. If it returns as scheduled, several Huawei-controlled companies mapped above could become subject to Entity List restrictions without being individually named, because of their ownership.
WireScreen's records also show Huawei's central operating company supplying Chinese tax authorities, state-owned telecom carriers, aerospace manufacturers and air-traffic-control authorities. These records aren't a complete customer ledger, but they reveal how deeply Huawei remains embedded in China's state economy.
Huawei employs 114,000 people in R&D — more than half its global workforce — and spent ¥192.3 billion (about $27.5 billion) on research in 2025. It is trying to reproduce not Nvidia's chips themselves, but Nvidia's role at the center of an AI computing ecosystem — a framing advanced by chip analyst Dylan Patel of SemiAnalysis.‡ Its Ascend chips sit beneath CANN software, Atlas computing systems and Huawei Cloud services; its Pangu models sit above them. WireScreen's records show that parts of this system sit inside specialized Huawei subsidiaries — but not every layer maps to a separate company, and some of the technology sits outside Huawei's ownership in either direction.
Huawei's own annual report puts numbers on the ecosystem it's trying to build around Ascend: more than four million developers, over 350 partners selling Ascend-based AI appliances, more than 3,000 partners producing over 6,700 industry solutions, and more than 60 foundation models pretrained on the platform. Those are the company's own figures, not independently audited — but they describe something larger than a chip launch: an attempt to build the developer tools, partner network and deployed systems that make a chip usable at scale, the way CUDA made Nvidia's hardware usable. One reported sign of outside interest came from DeepSeek, which is said to have given Huawei early access to its V4 model so it could be optimized for Ascend hardware, while withholding that same access from Nvidia and AMD.* Neither Huawei nor DeepSeek has publicly confirmed the arrangement.
The boundary is as important as the stack. Huawei appears to control chip design, software, systems, cloud deployment and its own models. But key parts of the physical semiconductor supply chain — including advanced fabrication, memory, packaging and manufacturing equipment — remain outside Huawei's direct ownership and control. Its model ecosystem now extends to outside developers, like DeepSeek, optimizing for its hardware rather than owning any part of it.
Recovering revenue and closing those manufacturing gaps are not the same achievement. Huawei has accomplished the first; its progress on the second remains incomplete.
Huawei has recovered almost all the revenue it lost after Washington's restrictions, and its growth accelerated in the first half of 2026 even as rising research and production costs reduced profit. The company remains dependent on China, but almost all its latest annual growth came from abroad. It has expanded into AI computing, energy and automobiles while trying to control more of the technology beneath them. Washington succeeded in changing Huawei. It did not prevent Huawei from rebuilding. Its long-delayed American prosecution remains unresolved.
Huawei's own financial disclosures: the 2025 Annual Report; the 2026 first-half interim financial report; the 2026 MTN002 bond prospectus, including its contingencies section, which discloses the pending U.S. criminal litigation.
WireScreen corporate records: five entity profiles opened directly for this report — Huawei Investment & Holding Co., Huawei Technologies Co., Huawei Device Co., Huawei Software Technologies Co., and HiSilicon Technologies Co. Facts about entities named within those profiles but not separately profiled — Huawei Cloud Computing Technology, Digital Power Technology, Yinwang, and others — are attributed to whichever parent profile discloses them. Yinwang's ownership structure is corroborated against Avatr Technology's and Seres's own disclosures of their 10% stake purchases, via Changan Automobile stock-exchange announcements (Aug. 2024–Oct. 2025).
Outside analysis: the "Nvidia's role, not just its chips" framing of Huawei's AI strategy draws on public commentary from chip analyst Dylan Patel (SemiAnalysis), cited at the specific claim in Section V.
U.S. government and court records: United States v. Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd., et al., No. 1:18-cr-00457 (E.D.N.Y.); Commerce Department/BIS Federal Register notices on the Entity List and the Affiliates Rule (90 FR 47201; suspension effective Nov. 10, 2025, through Nov. 10, 2026).
Huawei's 2025 Annual Report: huawei.com/en/annual-report/2025 · announcement: huawei.com/en/news/2026/3/annual-report-2025
* DeepSeek/Huawei early-access report: Reuters, "DeepSeek withholds latest AI model from US chipmakers including Nvidia, sources say," Feb. 25, 2026: reuters.com
† The $69.6 billion and $3.54 billion first-half 2026 figures use the contemporaneous exchange rate in effect when Huawei's interim results were reported (approximately ¥6.72 to the dollar), not the constant ¥6.91 rate used for the historical annual-revenue chart and other full-year comparisons in this report.
‡ Dylan Patel / SemiAnalysis, via Dwarkesh Podcast interviews (Mar 13 & Aug 25 2026) and a Sequoia Capital "Training Data" interview (Jun 30 2026).
Meng Wanzhou admissibility ruling: Reuters, "Huawei CFO's admissions can be used against company at criminal trial, US judge rules," Jun. 17, 2026: reuters.com
BIS Affiliates Rule and its suspension: bis.gov — Affiliates Rule · Federal Register — suspension notice
Huawei's 2026 first-half interim financial report: filed via China Money (chinamoney.com.cn). The 2026 MTN002 bond prospectus is filed through the same platform; Chinese-language filings of this kind do not carry a stable public English-language URL, so they are cited here by document title and filing date rather than link.
The interactive map below presents Huawei's principal ownership chain, 107 wholly owned entities identified in selected WireScreen profiles, and 67 overseas operating companies. It is a detailed view of Huawei's corporate structure, not a complete group-wide register; WireScreen has not recursively traced every entity through every subsequent ownership layer. It carries its own visual system, built separately from the rest of this report, and is shown here in an isolated frame with its own search and detail views.
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